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Abstract
The nature of language is the enigma linguists try to solve. What makes their task difficult is that in a
number of cases, the logical links between the different components of a linguistic unit are difficult to
establish. For example, in tone languages, the basic units that are the words are composed of two kinds
of minimal, significant sound units, the phonemes on the segmental tier and the tonemes on a distinct
tier. The word consists then of these two types of linguistic elements, related by phonological principles.
In Mawukakan, a Manding language spoken in Western Ivory Coast, the word resembles an architectural
construction where the function of some structures only becomes evident when you consider the building
with its surroundings. This is illustrated below by the tonal assignment of toneless clitics and the
lengthening of the vowel of the focus marker le in Mawu.
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Some Linguistic Speculations About Broca's
Aphasia
Sergey Avrutin

Psycholinguistics as a sub eld of Cognitive Science aims at understanding the relationship between the brain, the mind and language. The three
major elds of research in Psycholinguistics - language acquisition, real time
processing and language impairment - attempt to explain what is so special about human brain that enables us humans to acquire and understand
language. In this sense, studies of brain-damaged patients provide a unique
opportunity to investigate the relationship between a speci c cognitive capacity (e.g. language) and the brain.
I begin my presentation with a brief overview of the development of aphasia research. Focusing on two types of aphasia (Broca's and Wernicke's), researchers have traditionally associated the former with a production de cit
and the latter with a comprehension de cit. The picture thus appeared to
be very simple: a certain area in the brain comprehends language and another area produces it. Such a simpli ed picture was challenged and has
been proven wrong with the development of linguistic theory. Speci cally,
researchers have demonstrated that Broca's aphasics exhibit very speci c
problems with language comprehension, problems that can be characterized
only with the help of a linguistic theory.
After discussing the results of previously reported comprehension experiments carried out with Broca's aphasics, I turn to to an experiment that
I carried out in collaboration with Gregory Hickok. The goal of our experiment was to investigate to what degree two Broca's aphasics understand
Wh-questions. Our interest was stimulated by the proposals in the literature
that made certain predictions (although not overtly) about these constructions. In particular, the existing explanations do not dierentiate between
varios kinds of Wh-questions: which-questions and who-questions. In both
cases, a poor performance is predicted.
Our approach, however, predicted a dierent pattern of results for these
two kinds of questions. Based on data from real time processing experiments,
we argued that only which-questions should present a problem for the subjects because these (so-called D(iscourse)-linked constituents) require more
processing capacity. This prediction was borne out: both patients demonstrated above-chance performance on who-questions, and around chance performance on which-questions.
In addition, I hope to discuss results of an experiment with Italian speaking aphasics on adverb placement (reported in the literature) and show how
2

our approach accounts for these results, as well as present two experiments
that I have designed recently that will hopefully (!) support my proposal.
In conclusion I will present some central ideas of the model that I hope to
develop which would explain the abnormal pattern of comprehension not in
terms of loss of some linguistic knowledge but rather in terms of a limited
processing capacity.
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Some Aspects of Mawukakan Prosody
Moussa Bamba

1. Introduction
The nature of language is the enigma linguists try to solve. What makes
their task dicult is that in a number of cases, the logical links between
the dierent components of a linguistic unit are dicult to establish. For
example, in tone languages, the basic units that are the words are composed
of two kinds of minimal, signi cant sound units: the phonemes on the segmental tier and the tonemes on a distinct tier. The word consists then of
these two types of linguistic elements, related by phonological principles.
In Mawukakan, a Manding language spoken in Western Ivory Coast, the
word resembles an architectural construction where the function of some
structures only becomes evident when you consider the building with its
surroundings. This is illustrated below by the tonal assignment of toneless
clitics and the lengthening of the vowel of the focus marker le in Mawu.
2. The Prosodic Structure of the Mawukakan Noun Phrase
2.1 The tone assignment of the toneless determiner -lu
In Mawu, the noun phrase (NP) can be composed of a single noun root
or a noun root plus one or many determiners. Any noun root, independently
of its syllable structure, is assigned one of the four tonal patterns H (high),
L (low), H (L) (high-low) or LH (L) (low-high-low). The nal (L) of the two
last patterns is never associated with the syllables of the root, as shown in
(1).
(1)a: sisi ;; > sisi] "chest"

H
H
b: sisi ;; > sisi] "smoke"
L
L
c: gbusu ;; > gbusu] "gizzard"
H (L)
H
d: wotolo ;; > wotolo] "handcart"
LH (L)
LH

In (1a) where the underlying tone of the noun is H , each syllable has a
high tone on the surface, and in (1b) with an underlying L, each syllable is
realized low. In (1c), the noun is realized entirely high { as in (1a) { and
the (L) of the underlying pattern is missing. In (1d), the rst syllable of
4

the noun is associated with the rst tone of the underlying LH (L) tonal
pattern, and the two others syllables are speci ed by the H . Again, the
nal (L) does not show up.
However, when a toneless determiner is suxed to the noun roots in (2),
it is assigned an H after the patterns H and L, but bears an L after H (L)
and LH (L), as illustrated in (2).
(2)a: sisi + lu
;; > sisi ;lu] "chests"
H
!H
H
b: sisi + lu ;; > sisi ;lu] "smokes"

L
L
H
c: gbusu + lu ;; > gbusu ;lu] "gizzards"
H (L)
H
L
d: wotolo + lu ;; > wotolo ;lu] "handcarts"
LH (L)
LH
L

Given that -lu is realized with an H after both H and L, its tone cannot
result from the application of a normal tone rule in (2a,b). On the other
hand, the L it bears in (2c,d) reveals an association of the sux with the
oating (L) of the noun root, in this context.
In addition to the appearance of H in (2a,b), there is a further reason to
consider the H on -lu as the default tone at the tonal level in this derivation.
The reason is that these two types of noun roots behave dierently in relation
to an auxiliary, as can be seen in (3).
(3)
a: ku(H ) wEE (H ) ye(H ) ;; > ku wEE ye]
yam Aux:perf see
!H H !H
\A yam has been seen"
b: saa(L) wEE (H ) ye(H ) ;; > saa wEE ye]
sheep Aux:perf see
L H !H
"A sheep has been seen"
c: gbusu(H (L)) wEE (H ) ye(H ) ;; > gbusu wEE ye]
gizzard
Aux:perf see
H
!H H
"A gizzard has been seen"
d: wotolo(LH (L)) wEE (H ) ye(H ) ;; > wotolo wEE ye]
handcart
Aux:perf see
LH
!H H
"A handcart has been seen"
In (3a), the H of the auxiliary is realized higher than either the noun's
5

or the verb's H tones. In (3b), where the noun has an L tone, the H of
the auxiliary is higher than that of the verb. However, in (3c,d), the noun's
nal syllable is realized as a higher tone than what the auxiliary bears.
To account for the behavior of the nouns with a simple tonal pattern
(H , L) and those with a complex pattern (H (L), LH (L)), it is sucient to
assume that (i) nouns with a complex pattern bear underlying nal accent,
and (ii) in a sentence, the noun root and the morpheme adjacent on the right
are gathered in an iambic foot if the noun is not underlyingly accented, but
in a trochaic foot if the noun has a lexical accent.
2.2 The plural form of -le
In Mawu, the focus marker is a morpheme -le which is suxed to the
constituent. Like the plural morpheme -lu, -le is a determiner when it appears in the NP, where it can appear with all the other determiners. In (4),
-le is realized as -le when it appears in nal position or before the question
marker -a. But when followed by the plural marker -lu, it becomes -lee, with
its vowel lengthened.
(4)
a: saa+ le ;; > saa; le]

H

L

H

HL

"It's the squash seed."
b: saa+ le+ a ;; > saa; le; a?]

H

L

H

H

L

"It's the squash seed?"
c: saa+ o+ le+ lu ;; > saa; o; lee; lu]
H
0 L 0
H
H H L
"It's the squash seeds."
In nal position in (4a) and before -a in (4b), the variation aecting -le
is only tonal. In (4c) where it is followed by the plural morpheme -lu, -le
has its vowel lengthened and becomes -lee.
This lengthening is surprising given that -le and -lu are completely independent in the language. For example, saa(H) + lu realized as saa-luHH]
'squash seeds' is attested. To account for this unpredictable lengthening, I
suggest the underlying representation in (5) for -le, where S = syllable, O
= onset, N = nucleus and 0 is an empty segmental position.
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(5)

S
/ \

O
N
| / \
l e
0

The 0 at the segmental level in (5) will be lled only if the following
morpheme is the plural morpheme -lu.
One may ask why such a rare and exceptional structure as in (5) would
become necessary. The answer to this question is not purely phonological,
but also semantico-pragmatic. In fact, the strongest argument in favor of
(5) is that in Mawu, -lee is attested in an other contexts where the plurality
of the element in focus is inherent to this element. This context is the
emphatic plural pronouns which are composed of the non-emphatic forms
plus the focus marker, as in (6).
(6)a: a~+ le ;; > ~a; nee] "we(emphatic)"
H (L) L
H L
b: a+ le ;; > a; lee] "you ; PL(emphatic)"

H
c: i+
L

L
H H
le ;; > i; lee] "they (emphatic)"
L
L L

In (6), it is the long form -lee which is suxed to the plural emphatic
pronouns, while the singular emphatic pronouns appear with the short form
-le.
These two peculiarities of Mawu Phonology come to the rescue of certain
abstract structures in the search for a logical link between what is supposed
to be found in the input and what is obtained in the output structure.
3. Phonology is a cognitive science
The development of Phonological Theory is characterized by the discovery of the hidden connections between things which are apparently not
related. For example, the syllable today represents one of the most important discoveries, even if the notion refers to an abstract phonological unit
this is also the case with the notion of foot which represents a relationship
between syllables. Therefore, Phonology is a branch of Cognitive Science.
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Discourse Structure, Inference, and Marked
Syntactic Constructions
Betty J. Birner

Comprehension of any coherent discourse involves the tracking of information as it is introduced and developed. This tracking is facilitated in part
by the use of marked (i.e., non-canonical) syntactic constructions such as
those in (1):
(1) a. There is a rabbit in the garden.
b. He's a genius, that guy.
c. Sitting at the table was Aunt Mary.
The felicitous use of these constructions depends on a variety of factors relating to the `information status' of their constituents { for example,
whether the information they represent is already present in the interlocutors' shared model of the discourse or is assumed to be shared background
knowledge. The use of existential there, as in (1a), requires that the postverbal noun phrase (here, a rabbit) represent information that is new to the
hearer, whereas the use of right-dislocation, as in (1b), requires that the
sentence- nal noun phrase represent previously evoked information (Birner
& Ward 1996). The use of inversion, as in (1c), on the other hand, requires that the sentence-initial constituent represent more familiar information within the discourse than does the sentence- nal constituent (Birner
1994). Thus, these constructions can be used to indicate the relationship
that obtains between information being presented in the current utterance
and information already evoked in the discourse, or in the store of knowledge
assumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer.
One such relationship is that of identity another is inference. While
much work has been done on the tracking of identity relationships in discourse (through, e.g., the use of pronouns), much less has focused on information that is rendered `inferrable' (Prince 1981) on the basis of other information presented in the discourse, as exempli ed by the italicized phrases
in (2):
(2) a. I'll be up late writing this term paper I haven't even
nished the introduction.
b. That's a great mystery novel you'll never guess who
the murderer is.
c. I wanted to make some homemade bread last night, but
the recipe was illegible.
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In each of these examples, the entity represented by the italicized NP has not
been previously evoked, but its likely existence is inferrable from information
presented in the prior discourse.
An examination of natural discourse shows that inferential links can serve
the same connective function in a marked syntactic construction as do links
of identity. In English inversion, for example, inferrable information appears
in exactly the same range of positions and contexts as does information that
has been explicitly evoked in the prior discourse. Topicalization in English
and inversion in Farsi show a similar patterning with respect to word order
that is, inferrable information shows the same distribution as does explicitly
evoked information. An examination of such constructions suggests that
wherever the felicitous use of a construction depends upon the information
status of its constituents, inferrable information may appear in the same
range of positions as does explicitly evoked information.

References:

Birner, B. 1994. "Information status and word order: An analysis of
English inversion." Language 70:233-259.
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Genetics and Cognition
Juergen Haas

In recent years remarkable similarities between Genetics and Cognitive
Science have been uncovered, notably in the linguistic nature of DNA and
other genetic material. The source of such similarities may in part be due to
the fact that evolution and cognition require solutions to similar problems.
It is interesting that the human genome has characteristics that are usually
only associated with the human mind. The 23 human chromosomes are made
of about 3 billion base pairs which corresponds to roughly 1.5 gigabytes of
information. While it is not clear what percentage thereof is actually used,
there appears to be a large amount of "knowledge" encoded in the human
genome. Furthermore, the genome appears to have developed sophisticated
techniques to acquire new knowledge and to improve itself and the organism
it builds, i.e., it can "learn". The most striking cognitive aspect of the
genome is that is uses a type of "language" to organize its knowledge.
One of the problems faced by both genetics and cognition is the importance of rapid faithful replication of knowledge. In addition, it must be possible to "reason" about that knowledge, that is, to make "statements" about
pieces of information or to add new knowledge. In genetics this amounts
to manipulating small regulatory elements on the DNA which determine
whether a gene will be expressed and to what extent it is expressed. This
is achieved mainly through genetic recombination and other operations on
DNA molecules, which is analogous to forming quantitative statements in
natural language. The data structure best suited for these tasks appears to
be the one-dimensional digital array. Since most copies are made from other
copies, the digital nature of the data structure facilitates faithful reproductions over many generations without distortions. In Genetics this array is
essentially the DNA using an "alphabet" of four nucleotides: A, C, G and
T. In Cognitive Science the corresponding construct is language with letters
or phonemes as the elements of the arrays.
In both domains the task is to encode information to build complex
multi-dimensional structures in one-dimensional strings, which leads to a
structuring of the string that can be captured by grammars. We can say
that a sentence in natural language roughly corresponds to a gene in genetics.
The functional units of a gene, such as exons, coding regions and regulatory
elements, are hierarchically organized into "phrases" to form the complete
structure of the gene. We have developed grammars and parsers for a large
class of genes and applied it to detect inconsistencies in genetic databases
by checking the "grammaticality" of the given information. An extension of
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the parser can even correct certain types of such errors and infer additional
information, thus making it possible to automatically construct databases
with uniform and consistent gene structure information. Such databases
have been successfully used for applying machine learning techniques, such
as various forms of Case-Based Reasoning, to infer additional information.
Further development of such grammars is necessary to capture the structure
and arrangement of regulatory regions that surround the core sequence of a
gene.
The function of most genes is to construct an amino acid sequence that
folds into a particular functional protein (the "semantics" of a gene). However, certain classes of genes result in functional molecules by constructing
RNA sequences that fold into characteristic con gurations. The folding
pattern (secondary structure) is determined in large part by pairwise interactions between the elements of the sequence. A class of grammars has been
developed that can detect patterns in DNA or amino acid sequences that
correspond to secondary structure, thus facilitating prediction of secondary
structure. Typically, such grammars are stochastic in nature and are trained
on a set of sequences whose secondary structure is known.
While the linguistic aspect of genes plays a crucial role in genetics and
evolution, the three-dimensional physical properties of the proteins constructed from the DNA are what keeps an organism functioning and alive.
In particular a large number of proteins interact with each other and DNA
molecules to regulate gene expression (the rate at which proteins are generated). Such interactions are responsible, for example, for cell dierentiation.
In order to understand these mechanisms researchers have developed a number of software packages for modeling molecules (such as proteins) and simulating the forces within and between them. However, in order to discover
molecular mechanisms involved in gene regulation we are developing a reasoning/learning component in addition to a specialized modeling/simulation
component that can hypothesize molecular structures and mechanisms and
verify or reject them through simulation.
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An Adapting Brain
Lance Hahn

In order to survive it is important for a human, or any animal, to attend
to what is important (i.e. a predator or food) and to ignore what is irrelevant. By attending we are simply devoting available mental resources to the
important target. This is done at many dierent processing levels. At one
level, we choose to pay attention to a speaker and ignore the person we are
sitting next to, at another level we pay attention the changes in light levels
within a room and ignore the absolute light level. I am interested in how the
human visual system modi es itself in order to pay attention to relative light
levels within one context. In particular, I am interested in light adaptation
mechanisms and neuron-based descriptions of these mechanisms.
One of my projects this year has been to resolve a debate between
anatomists and visual psychophysicists. Anatomists have shown that each
cone photoreceptor in the retina is connected to its neighbors via electrical synapses. This implies that adjacent photoreceptors interact. Visual
psychophysicists, on the other hand, use behavioral measurements to show
that the response of a receptor in the high acuity region of the retina (the
fovea) is independent of its neighbor's response. One hypothesis which can
resolve this dispute, is that the electrical synapses are only functional under
certain restricted circumstances. At low luminance levels, where previous
behavioral measurements are ambiguous, electrical synapses could improve
the representation of light levels at the cost of spatial resolution. I will discuss the recent measurements which I have made and relate them to this
hypothesis.
The new psychophysical measurements, and a collaborative work on
which the potential photoreceptor interaction was modeled, suggest that
the electrical synapses may not change as a function of light level, but could
be useful in reducing noise at all light levels. At low light levels the signalto-noise ratio is reduced by photon noise. At high light levels photon noise
does not reduce the signal-to-noise ratio as much as at low light levels, but
intrinsic cellular noise can play a larger role in reducing the signal-to-noise
ratio. Thus, noise reduction via photoreceptor coupling may be desirable
across light levels.
In order to answer the large questions of how we perceive, think and
act we must understand what neural tools are available to the brain. By
establishing links between known neural structures and known behavior, we
begin to understand neural tools which shape the way we perceive, think
and act at many neural loci.
13

Language Complexity and Theories of Syntax
James Rogers

Early theories of syntax within Generative Linguistics were based primarily in the realm of rewriting systems|Phrase Structure Grammars of
varying types and Transformational Grammars. This approach was formally very fruitful, yielding, in particular, hierarchies of language complexity classes. While it is questionable how appropriate speci c results in this
realm are for linguistic theory, the underlying form of the results corresponds
reasonably closely to issues that are linguistically relevant. Moreover, these
classes have dual characterizations in terms of the structure of the languages
in the class and in terms of the types of resources that are required to process
these languages. Thus hypotheses about where the class of human languages
falls with respect to these hierarchies make predictions about the nature of
the human language faculty which correspond precisely to predictions about
the structure of natural languages. Since the structure of language can be
studied more or less directly, there is reasonable expectation of nding empirical evidence falsifying such hypotheses, should it exist.
More recently there has been a de-emphasis of the role of the mechanism
deriving strings in the language in favor of well-formedness conditions on the
structures that analyze their syntax. Government and Binding Theory is an
example of such an approach. While theories in this framework are usually
modeled as a speci c range of Transformational Grammars, the connection
between the underlying mechanism and the language the theory licenses is
quite weak. In an extreme view, one can take the mechanism to generate
the set of all nite trees (labeled with some alphabet) while the linguistic
theory is actually embodied in a set of principles that lter out the illformed analyses. At least some of the motivation for taking this approach
is an awareness that the structural characteristics that distinguish natural
languages as a class may not be those that can be distinguished by existing
language complexity classes. Thus the insights to be gained from formal
language theory may actually be misleading in trying to develop a theory
of human language. Nonetheless, as we have just argued, there are good
reasons for establishing language complexity results for the class of languages
licensed by such a theory. Berwick has suggested that one might consider
the GB approach as aiming to \discover the properties of natural languages
rst, and then characterize them formally."
The diculty of the rst step of this program is well attested. Unfortunately, because GB theories are based more in the notion of licensing
than in the notion of rewriting, the second step has proved quite dicult as
14

well. One of the things I have been studying is a exible and quite powerful
method of establishing such results. This starts with a typical approach to
formalizing GB theories|de ning the set of structures they license with a
set of logical axioms|but requires that the axioms be stated within a particular restricted logical language, termed L2 . On one hand, the restriction is
reasonably weak it is not dicult to capture most of the principles employed
in GB theories reasonably transparently. On the other hand, it turns out
to be a quite powerful restriction formally one can show that a set of nite
trees can be de ned in L2 if and only if it is (modulo a projection) a local
set|the set of derivation trees licensed by a Context-Free Grammar. Thus
de nability in L2 characterizes the strongly Context-Free Languages.
Using this result, one can explore the relative complexity of various constellations of principles within the GB framework. One can show, for instance, that free-indexation, at least in its most general form, cannot be
enforced by a Context-Free Grammar. Somewhat more surprising, perhaps,
is the fact that a reasonably complete GB account of English can be captured
within L2 , thus establishing that the languages licensed by a speci c GB
theory are strongly Context-Free. While I will discuss these results briey,
the focus of this talk will be the potential implications such results may have
with respect to the nature of the human language faculty. As it turns out,
re nements of GB theories have tended to make them more amenable to
de nition in L2 . This suggests that the regularities in natural languages
that motivate the linguistic theories might, in fact, be reections of properties of the human language faculty that can be characterized, at least to
some extent, by language complexity classes.
K P

K P

K P

K P

K P
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The Morpho-Phonological Basis of Syntactic
Parameters
Bernhard Rohrbacher

Current linguistic theory assumes that the human brain is genetically
endowed with a language faculty referred to as Universal Grammar (UG)
which contains at least two types of elements: principles and parameters.
UG principles are xed at birth, or mature independently of the language
speci c input they are responsible for the immutable facts of human language, such as the fact that no human language allows extraction from one
of two conjuncts, as shown by the ungrammatical English example *Who
did you see the boy and?
UG parameters are xed by the child on the basis of the language speci c
input they are responsible for the variation among human languages, such
as the fact that some but not all human languages allow missing subjects in
constituent questions, as shown by the grammatical Italian example Quante
pietre hai preso? (How-many stones have-2SG taken) and its English translation How many stones did you take?
It has recently been suggested that UG parameters are xed exclusively
on the basis of language speci c properties of functional categories such
as tense, negation and subject-verb agreement (cf. Chomsky 1989). The
parametrically relevant properties of functional categories are often assumed
to be abstract, but this assumption is problematic since it often results in
a circular theory which 'explains' a syntactic phenomenon by appealing to
abstract features for which the syntactic phenomenon in question constitutes
the only evidence. To avoid this problem, I propose that the parametrically
relevant properties of functional categories are concrete in the sense that
they are reected in the overt morpho-phonology of these categories.
In this talk, I discuss the feasability of this theory with respect to the
missing subject parameter illustrated above (cf. Rohrbacher 1994, Speas
1994). The data come from young children acquiring English, German or
Swedish who frequently omit subjects although the target gramar does in
general not allow this. I argue that such early subject omissions follow from
the (non-adult like) morpho-phonological tense and agreement systems of
the children and in particular from their tendency to utter unembedded
non- nite clauses (cf. Roeper & Rohrbacher 1995, Rohrbacher & Vainikka
1995).
If parameterization involves only the overt morpho-phonological properties of functional categories, then children have to learn only the bare
16

essentials, i.e. the idiosyncratic and irreducible shapes of the words of their
target language. As far as I can see, this represents the simplest conceivable
theory of language acquisition. This theory may in fact very well turn out
to be overly simplistic, but that seems to me to be worth nding out.
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Motion Perception and the Spherical Eye
Inigo Thomas

Mobility is a crucial ability which divides the universe of living things
into two categories: animals that move and plants that do not. Needless
to say, it is of great importance for animals to sense self-motion as well as
to perceive the world while moving. Designing motion sensors has played
a prominent role in building arti cial animals (robots), especially using the
modality of vision.
As an observer moves, the images on his or her retina continuosly change.
These changes are systematically related to the observer's motion and the
location of objects in the world. For example, while looking out a train
window, objects close to you move faster on your retina than objects further
away. Although the accuracy with which humans can tell their direction of
motion is still unknown, it seems quite obvious that humans can tell which
way they are moving with respect to the environment purely from visual
information. Such perception of motion { purely from visual input { is very
striking when watching a movie in an Omni-Max (large, dome-screened)
Theater.
Introspection reveals that when a human observer moves, the eye continually xates on (or tracks) targets in the world. Further, the spherical
human retina allows humans to see a very large eld of view, almost 180
degrees along most directions. Although both xation and a very large
eld{of{view are involved in human vision, the computational advantage of
either (if any) for the perception of self{motion has not been established.
The main contributions of this work include (i) formalizing changes occuring in the retina for a moving, xating observer, (ii) using a hemispherical
retina/imager to simplify the patterns of image changes, and (iii) thereby
isolating very simple patterns at the retinal periphery that could be useful
in determining an observer's direction of heading.
We will focus on very simple image changes that occur when an observer moves. More speci cally, we will focus only on whether objects move
upwards or downwards in one's retina during one's motion. Both mathematics and intuition indicate that if an observer moves direct ahead, i.e. in
the direction he or she is looking, the retina is divided precisely into two
halves: one region where all objects move upwards and the other where the
objects move downwards. However, if instead the observer heads in any
other direction than directly ahead, the retina is divided into four regions!
Furthermore, the ratio of the areas of these regions is precisely and directly
related to the direction of one's heading.
18

Since we do not have any experiments where human observers were
shown these patterns and asked about the perceived direction of heading
(owing primarily to the diculty in generating large eld{of{view movies),
we are unable to make any claims regarding whether these patterns are actually employed by humans. However, since these patterns are very simple, it
is possible that human visual perception uses them. If I had a psychologistgenie I would ask it to test humans with images in Omni-Max Theaters
with these simple patterns. If I had a second genie, I would like it to nd
the portion(s) of the brain that is (are) involved in the perception of one's
motion. If I had a third genie, I would like it to philosophize on movement:
What is movement? Is the notion of movement an inescapable consequence
of a changing, material universe? Or, quite the contrary, what would be the
consequence of the lack of motion? That is, would a universe where matter
remained stationary become timeless?
Instead of testing the predictions about direction of heading perception
on humans, I have tested them on robots using the rst actual hemispherical
lens-camera system in motion research, involving a 180 degree eld-of-view
lens. I will conclude my talk with a video clip that depicts a mobile robot
{ equipped with the new lens { continuously monitoring its direction of
motion, and thereby servoing to a visually identi ed target.
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The Emergence of Sentence Structure
Anne Vainikka

A profound discovery of modern syntax is that sentences consist of three
basic components: VP, IP and CP. The core of a sentence is the VP component, which contains the verb and its arguments. The IP component contains inectional morphology which typically anchors the VP in real time
(tense) or in possible worlds (modality). The third component, CP, contains
elements which connect the sentence to other sentences or to discourse.
By the age of about three, children have clearly mastered these three
components of sentences. For example, Fortescue (1984) reports that a
child learning Greenlandic Eskimo used a set of about 60 inectional axes
at the age of 2 years and 3 months the adult language has over 700 such
axes. In this language, sentences often consist of a single word, a verb
with a number of axes attached to it. Around the age of two, however,
verbs can have at most two axes at the same time (e.g. subject-verb
agreement and aspectual marking, related to the IP component). By the age
of about three, Greenlandic Eskimo speakers produce verbs with four axes,
including subordinating enclitics which are related to the CP component
(Fortescue & Lennert Olsen 1992).
What happens before the age of three? Are all three components present
from birth? (This is a common view cf. Hyams 1992, Poeppel & Wexler
1993.) Is just the core component (VP) present from birth, while the other
two develop due to biological maturation? (This is the view developed in
Radford (1990).) Are all three learned based on the input? This is the
view that I have put forth (Vainikka 1993/4), with the proviso that such
'learning' is rmly guided by an innate language acquisition mechanism.
Under this view, it appears that the VP-component is acquired prior
to the age of 2, while the IP-component appears to come in around the
age of 2, and the CP-component around 2 1/2 to 3 years of age. The hypothesis of gradual acquisition of sentence structure has been tested for English (Vainikka 1993/4 and Vainikka & Roeper 1995), German (Rohrbacher
& Vainikka 1994), and Tamil (a Dravidian language Vainikka & Thomas
1994). Work on the acquisition of Swedish, Greek and Hebrew is in progress.
Although some of the predictions made by my approach are similar to
those made by Radford's biological maturation approach, I am convinced
that maturation is not involved in the acquisition of sentence structure. This
conviction stems from our work on the naturalistic (non-classroom) acquisition of foreign languages by adults, who also appear to rst posit the VP
component in the new language, followed by the IP component, followed
20

by the CP component (Vainikka & Young-Scholten 1994). Biological maturation could not be responsible for such a pattern of development in adult
language acquisition assuming that the two similar patterns should be accounted for by the same mechanism, the child pattern would not involve
maturation either.
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The Representation of Syntactic Knowledge
Spyridoula Varlokosta

The word cognitive refers to knowledge. Cognitive Science is a science
that seeks to understand various mental processes such as perceiving, remembering, understanding, or learning. Hence, what constitutes the domain of inquiry of Cognitive Science is essentially the architecture of the
human mind which is viewed as a complex system that receives, stores, and
processes various kinds of information.
One of the disciplines that comprise Cognitive Science is Linguistics,
which concerns the scienti c inquiry to the human language. The goal of
Linguistics is to understand how language is represented in the human mind,
how it is acquired, how it is perceived and used, and how it relates to
other components of cognition. Language has been traditionally viewed as
a relationship between a physical signal and a meaning. A formal account
of such a relationship is called a Grammar. A Grammar must be able to
characterize both what we know about the physical signal and the meaning,
as well as the mapping between the two. The latter is what the area of
Syntax deals with.
The speci c syntactic topic discussed here is reference of empty subjects
and in particular the relationship between the Tense properties of embedded
clauses and the reference of their empty subjects. The linguistic evidence is
drawn primarily from Modern Greek.
Unlike English or the various Romance languages, Modern Greek does
not have in nitives. Instead, Modern Greek makes use of a nite construction (known as the subjunctive construction) in the corresponding English
or Romance in nitival contexts. These constructions are introduced by the
particle na and take a verb which is always inected for Agreement and
Aspect.
The possibility of obligatory coreference (as in (1)) or its absence (as in
(2)) is shown to be associated with the tense and aspectual properties of
the subordinate clauses in (1) and (2), respectively, namely to the ability
of the embedded clause to form an aspectually and temporally independent
domain:
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(1)a: O

Y anis
John ; Nom
b: O Y anis
John ; Nom

arxise
started
arxise
started

(2)a: I Maria

na
PRT
na
PRT

elpizi na
Mary ; Nom hopes PRT
b: I Maria
elpizi na
Mary ; Nom hopes PRT

kolimbai
swims ; 3Sg=Present
kolimbuse
swam ; 3Sg=Past

pai
goes ; 3Sg=Pres
pige
went ; 3Sg=Past

sto
to
sto
to

Parisi
Paris
Parisi
Paris

As cognitive scientists our goal is to provide a formal characterization of
the form in which human beings represent knowledge and process information. As linguists, our task is to uncover general characteristics, properties,
or principles of human languages that reect aspects of the architecture of
the human mind. If in the course of investigating a particular language we
uncover something we think is a signi cant general principle of language, we
are led to hypothesize such a principle as part of the biological architecture
of the linguistic processing system. This is a very powerful tool because
it directs us to look for evidence which our hypotheses are consistent with
in data from other human languages. Hence, when a certain claim about
a universal principle makes interesting predictions, it motivates further research concerning its role in other languages and ultimately concerning its
signi cance for the structure of the human mind.
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Commentary: What Is Cognitive Science?
Gary Hateld
Dept. of Philosophy

These ten interesting and diverse presentations are part of a workshop
in which Penn IRCS postdoctoral fellows present their work while speaking
to, or perhaps answering through example, the question: What is cognitive
science? As a framework for my commentary, I rst present two contrasting
global answers to this question. I associate the rst answer with the "symbolist view," the second with the "cognitive capacities view" of cognitive
science.
>From ca. 1975-1985 it was widely accepted that cognitive science is or
should be de ned as a discipline through its commitment to a particular
theoretical vision of the structure of human cognition, according to which
the human mind is a computational device with a basic architecture like
that of a von Neumann machine (Kosslyn & Hat eld 1984 Pylyshyn 1989).
The human brain is attributed an "internal symbol system" or "language
of thought" (Fodor 1975) in which all cognitive operations are performed.
The brain is conceived as a device that is built to use a speci c "machine
language" this built-in symbol system has been dubbed the "classical architecture" (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). Commonly, adherents of the classical
architecture envision three levels of analysis: a semantic level, which pertains to referential semantics or to representation/world relations a syntactic level, pertaining to the formal properties of representations and the
rules de ned over those representations solely in virtue of their formal properties (rules that de ne the basic computational architecture of a cognitive
system) and a neural level, pertaining to the hardware realization of the
symbol-processing mechanisms. Under this conception, cognitive science
is uni ed into a single discipline by its commitment to the symbol-system
architecture for human cognition.
The "cognitive capacities" view de nes cognitive science by its subject
matter, rather than by its commitment to a particular theoretical paradigm.
"Cognitive science" is a cross- disciplinary, cooperative program for studying
the cognitive capacities of human beings and related species. These capacities include perception, language processing, memory, learning, problem
solving, and reasoning. They all involve representing the world, or at least
ostensibly doing so. The disciplines of cognitive science study the structure
of these representations and their relations to the world, and they seek to
analyze the processes by which these representations are formed and used
in various cognitive tasks. Three levels of analysis may be described here
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too: the task analysis, which describes the function of a given system, or its
task in relation the larger cognitive system (e.g., in mammals an important
task of the visual system is to form a representation of the ambient spatial
layout) a second level often described as the "algorithmic" (Marr 1982) or
"representational" (Hat eld 1991) level, but which might better be termed
the level of functional analysis, since it involves an analysis of the task into
subtasks, which in the case of representational tasks focuses on the processes
by which representations are formed and nally a level of neural implementation. Under this conception of cognitive science the taxonomy of cognitive
research is set by the task analyses. The functional architecture of cognitive
subsystems and the relations between such systems can be analyzed prior to
any particular commitments regarding the formal properties of elementary
representations. In particular, the question is left open of whether symbolic
representations are themselves primitive to the human cognitive system or
are constructed from still more primitive representational elements.
These two answers to the title question yield two distinct conceptions
of cognitive science as a discipline. The symbolist view would attempt to
assimilate all cognitive processing to AI-inspired computational models. If
it is the correct view, linguists, AI researchers, psychologists, and neuroscientists will eventually all be in the same building on the same grant (Fodor,
in conversation), for they will all be studying the structure and implementation of a single "language of thought." This vision has the advantage of
providing a strong identity to cognitive science as a discipline it has the
disadvantage of yielding the implication that if the computer-metaphor is
wrong, then cognitive science is ill-founded as an area of study. The cognitive capacities view ts easily with the conception of cognitive science as
a federation of independent disciplines that enter into cooperative relations
for investigating and analyzing various cognitive tasks. The speci c degree
of theoretical uni cation among the disciplines is left an open question, to
be decided empirically in the long run.
After hearing the presentations, I've tried to discern whether each speaker's
research practice corresponds to the "symbolist" or "cognitive capacities"
view. Haas' talk concerns the linguistic metaphor as applied to genetics, and
so may contain an implicit commitment to symbolism. Each of the other
nine presentations was consistent with the cognitive capacities approach,
and none showed evidence of an explicit commitment to symbolism. Viewed
from the cognitive capacities perspective, all ten presentations involve a
task analysis. Six of them describe or functionally characterize subprocesses within that analysis: Avrutin, Haan, Haas, Rogers, Rohrbacher, and
Vainikka. One, Avrutin, examines the relation between task analysis and
disruption of a cognitive system caused by neural damage.
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In sum, nine of the ten presentations show no practical commitment to
the symbolist paradigm. This small sample supports the conclusion that
commitment to the "classical architecture" is not a standard component of
the research practice of cognitive science today.
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